Federal administrative elite of Russia: features of a career after leaving office

Federal administrative elite of Russia: features of a career after leaving office

Tev D.B.,

The Sociological Institute of the RAS – Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg, Russia, denis_tev@mail.ru

elibrary_id: 180843 | ORCID: 0000-0001-5442-7585 | RESEARCHER_ID: N-5461-2017

Article received: 2021.11.08. Accepted: 2022.04.04

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2023.01.10

Rubric: Russia today

For citation:

Tev D.B. Federal administrative elite of Russia: features of a career after leaving office. – Polis. Political Studies. 2023. No. 1. P. 130-146. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2023.01.10. EDN: BBGNON


The article analyzes the career prospects of those having left the position of members of the federal administrative elite of Russia in 2013. The empirical study draws on a biographical database that includes 575 questionnaires updated in 2020. The theoretical framework of the study is B. Harasymiw’s model of elite recruitment. The study made it possible to identify the role that three areas of employment (corresponding to the main factions of the power elite) play in the post-career of the federal administrators. If administrative bodies (primarily at the federal level) and, to a lesser extent, business are the main recruiters of officials who have left their post, the role of representative bodies is insignificant. The “pulling” (connections, opportunity structure) and “pushing” (motivation, etc.) factors of the post-career of high-ranking officials are analyzed. According to the author, the career patterns of federal officials after leaving office allow for a better understanding of the features of the political and economic system in Russia. In particular, their demand in business emphasizes the “crony” nature of Russian capitalism, and the transition to the highest posts in parliament and the offices of governors may indicate that the federal administration is under the control of the legislature and regional authorities. It also seems that the migration of key figures in the federal administration to elite positions in other government institutions (parliament, business, etc.) contributes to inter-factional integration of the power elite. In addition, the post-career of federal officials may be related to their behavior while in office. In particular, the prospect of going into business after retirement may motivate them to adopt policies that are in the interests of potential employers, leading to “conflicts of interest”. Finally, the study made it possible to assess the stability of the elite membership: although in general, the trend of renewal (circulation) of the elite prevails, the trend of its personal reproduction is quite pronounced.

federal administrative elite, career after leaving office, administration, business, parliament.


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Content No. 1, 2023

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