The Ten Aporias of Our Time. The Theory and Practice of Nuclear Deterrence

The Ten Aporias of Our Time. The Theory and Practice of Nuclear Deterrence

Arbatov A.G.,

Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia,

elibrary_id: 73079 |

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2021.04.08

For citation:

Arbatov A.G. The Ten Aporias of Our Time. The Theory and Practice of Nuclear Deterrence. – Polis. Political Studies. 2021. No. 4. P. 88-111. (In Russ.).


Rising international tensions and the risks of sliding towards a nuclear conflict in the face of the erosion of the arms control system between Russia and the West is becoming an essential subject of modern political discourse. In particular, the author investigates the psychological aspects of deterrence, the dichotomy of its functions of preventing and conducting nuclear war, the concepts of first and retaliatory strike, the dialectics of defense and offence, and plans for limited nuclear war, the effect of the entanglement of nuclear and conventional weapons. 

limited nuclear war, launch-on-warning, escalation, ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems, space weapons, cyberwarfare, missile defense, arms control.

Дополнительные материалы


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Content No. 4, 2021

See also:

Arbatov A.G.,
Doomsday Dialectics: the Arms Race with Arms Limitations. – Polis. Political Studies. 2019. No3

Arbatov A.G.,
Threats to Strategic Stability – Imaginary and Real. – Polis. Political Studies. 2018. No3

Sevostyanov P.I. , Mizin V.I.,
Climate, nuclear weapons control and cyber threats: three problems or one?. – Polis. Political Studies. 2024. No3

Oznobishchev S.K.,
Policy and Arms Control. – Polis. Political Studies. 2021. No6

Istomin I.A., Crowley-Vigneau A.,
International norms in the face of technological change: challenges for constructivist theory of arms control. – Polis. Political Studies. 2023. No4



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