International assistance and sanctions pressure: geometry of interlinkages

International assistance and sanctions pressure:
geometry of interlinkages

Article received: 2022.03.17. Accepted: 2022.07.12
DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2022.06.03

For citation:

Bartenev V.I. International assistance and sanctions pressure: geometry of interlinkages. – Polis. Political Studies. 2022. No. 6. P. 23-37. (In Russ.).


This paper presents a novel approach to the conceptualization of an increasingly relevant nexus between international assistance and sanctions pressure. The first section outlines the theoretical and methodological framework of the study. It demarcates the borders of each concept and exposes numerous variations of foreign policy tools as well as forms of their usage. It reveals and structures a net of interlinkages in such a way that allows to overlook these differences. The strings of logic are first grouped into two ‘dimensions’ – ‘aid sanctions’ and ‘aid under sanctions’ and then placed within a special matrix built on the juxtaposition of two conventional actor typologies 1) sender countries, target countries and third countries, and 2) aid providers and aid recipients. The possible impact of sanctions on aid absorption or provision as well as on the actors’ choices in dealing with the consequences of sanctions pressure are considered. The second and the third sections outline and explain the correspondent strings of logic within each dimension with the help of scholarly literature and relevant examples from world politics of the XX – XXI centuries. The conclusion contains a completed matrix and argues for the existence of a ‘aid–sanctions nexus’ as a distinctive phenomenon and a research topic to be explored by aid and sanctions experts as well as area specialists. The in-depth knowledge of the factual fabric might help build a dataset of representative cases and discover unknown dimensions and vectors of mutual influence between its components.


international assistance, sanctions pressure, restrictive measures, aid providers, aid recipients, sender country, target country, third countries, human rights, humanitarian exemptions.


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Content No. 6, 2022

See also:

Timofeev I.N.,
“Sanctions for Sanctions Violation”: U.S. Department of Treasury Enforcement Actions against Financial Sector. – Polis. Political Studies. 2020. No6

Korgun I.A., Toloraya G.D.,
On the question of effectiveness of sanctions against DPRK. – Polis. Political Studies. 2022. No3

Arapova E.Ya., Kudinov A.S.,
International sanctions legislation in the U.S., EU and UK: a comparative study. – Polis. Political Studies. 2022. No6

Timofeev I.N.,
The U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: Experience and Eventual Implications. – Polis. Political Studies. 2018. No4

Bartenev V.I.,
Domestic political determinants of foreign aid instruments: a model kit. – Polis. Political Studies. 2014. No5



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