Avoiding nuclear war. Problems of escalation/de-escalation of armed conflicts when approaching the “nuclear threshold”
Baranovsky V.G.,
MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia; Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, baranovsky@imemo.ru
elibrary_id: 627742 |
Buzhinsky E.P.,
MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia; Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, Russia; PIR-Center, Moscow, Russia; HSE University, Moscow, Russia; Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia, buzhinsky@pircenter.org
Zagorsky A.V.,
MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia; Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, zagorskiandrei@gmail.com
Nikitin A.I.,
MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia; Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia; HSE University, Moscow, Russia; Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia; Russian Political Science Association, Moscow, Russia, an@inno.mgimo.ru
elibrary_id: 637132 | ORCID: 0000-0003-3509-6893 | RESEARCHER_ID: O-6521-2015
Oznobishchev S.K.,
MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia; Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, serko96@gmail.com
elibrary_id: 251323 |
Article received: 2022.07.04. Accepted: 2022.08.09
DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2022.06.09
Baranovsky V.G., Buzhinsky E.P., Zagorsky A.V., Nikitin A.I., Oznobishchev S.K. Avoiding nuclear war. Problems of escalation/de-escalation of armed conflicts when approaching the “nuclear threshold”. – Polis. Political Studies. 2022. No. 6. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2022.06.09
The article has been prepared in the framework of the MGIMO grant project “Systemic Advancement of the International Activities of the MGIMO Institute for International Studies” (Project 2022-02-02, project chaired by A. Nikitin) and presents main findings of the Analytical Report elaborated within this project.
Several historic international conflicts, considered in the article, have presented a risk of nuclear weapons being used. The authors analyze and systematize factors and methods that allowed the sides to prevent the escalation of such conflicts to the “nuclear threshold” and avoid the risk of catastrophic consequences linked to passing such a “threshold”. The opportunity and probability of avoiding a nuclear escalation that is caused by unintended or unsanctioned actions, human and technical mistakes, malfunctions, wrong interpretations of the actions of the potential adversary are discussed. The authors review existing mechanisms of de-escalation of military-political incidents and analyse the complex of confidence-building and security assuring measures. Their validity and applicability in modern conditions are considered through a study of the current tense situation in Russia’s relations with the West/NATO, as well as in a long-term (in scale of decades) perspective.
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See also:
Arbatov A.G.,
Nuclear reloading and international security. – Polis. Political Studies. 2011. No3
Arbatov A.G.,
Doomsday Dialectics: the Arms Race with Arms Limitations. – Polis. Political Studies. 2019. No3
Sorokin K.E.,
Nuclear Weapons in the Era of Geopolitical Multipolarity. – Polis. Political Studies. 1995. No4
Virtual workshop: International politics and conflicts. – Polis. Political Studies. 2008. No2
Virtual workshop: International politics and conflicts. – Polis. Political Studies. 2007. No6